Introduction
Among logicians it is well-known that Leibniz was the first to conceive of a mathematical treatment of logic. Much less known, however, was his insistence that there was need for a new kind of logic that would treat of degrees of probability. Although it isn't clear what Leibniz had in mind for such a logic-understandably, since the subject of probability had just begun in his lifetime and the florescence of modern logic was not to begin until the 19th century-he did envision that it would be a means for estimating likelihoods and a way of proof leading not to certainty but only to probability (see his Nouveaux Essais, pp. 372-373). Beginning in his day, and extending through the present century, a number of mathematicians and logicians, e.g., Jacob Bernoulli, J. H. Lambert, A. De Morgan, G. Boole, C. S. Peirce, J. M. Keynes, H. Reichenbach, R. Carnap, and, more recently, D. Scott and P. Krauss have made either forays or detailed attacks on establishing such a logic, but with differing conceptions as to its nature. A few brief remarks will give some idea as to what these were like.
To Bernoulli (as also to Leibniz) probability was degree of certainty, differing from it as part to whole. In his Λrs Conjectandi (Part IV, Chapter III) he considers the various kinds of arguments (i.e., grounds) for a conclusion (opinion or conjecture) and the problem of estimating their weights so as to compute the probability of the conclusion. Situations involving arguments are divided into three types: those in which the argument is necessarily the case but indicates (proves) the conclusion only contingently; those in which the argument is contingent but when present necessarily proves the conclusion; and those in which the presence of the argument and its proving of the conclusion are both contingent. The * 'proving power" of an argument is determined by the number of cases in which the argument is, or is not, present and also by the number of probabilities of other events logically related to it in any manner. Though Boole was not conscious of it as such we have here the nub of a probability logic: by taking as premises the assertions that the several starting propositions have the assigned probabilities and as conclusion the assertion that the objective proposition has the (sought for) probability value, we have, in effect, an inference in a Leibnizian *'logic of degrees of probability". Boole believed, on the basis of his view of probability, that he had solved the central problem, and in a general form which included conditional probabilities (see [7] , Chapters 4 and 5).
One of the examples Boole works out ( [1] , Example 7, p. 284) is that of finding the probability of the conclusion of a hypothetical syllogism given the probabilities of its premises. Unfortunately he confuses the probability of a conditional (probability of: if A, then B) with conditional probability (probability of B, given A) and solves not the stated problem (which nevertheless his method could handle) but one involving conditional probabilities. While De Morgan restricted himself to arguments in which the conclusion was a necessary consequence of the premises (though these premises could have less than certainty), no such restriction is present in Boole's method. Another novel feature of Boole's work was his general investigation of bounds on probabilities when the data were insufficient to determine a value. The principal result on which we base our work (Section 3 below) is a direct outgrowth of these ideas of Boole.
C. S. Peirce was one of the great formal logicians of the 19th century who also thought intensively about the nature of probability. It is thus surprising that his long essay "A Theory of Probable Inference" of 1883 [11] has no systematic consideration of the formal grounds for justifying probable inferences. Indeed, one gets the impression that he thinks probable inference is not entirely formal. For example, in citing the wide differences, despite analogies, between "syllogistic" and probable inference he writes: (3) A cardinal distinction between the two kinds of inference is, that in demonstrative reasoning the conclusion follows from the existence of the objective facts laid down in the premisses; while in probable reasoning these facts themselves do not render the conclusion probable, but account has to be taken of various subjective circumstances-of the manner in which the premisses have been obtained, of there being no countervailing considerations; etc.; in short, good faith and honesty are essential to good logic in probable reasoning. ( [11] , p. 435) By contrast, in Keynes [10] , the explicit aim is to formalize the theory of probability. There is a philosophical analysis of probability as a relation between propositions-considered by Keynes to be a logical relation-and axioms for it are presented. This relation behaves similarly to conditional probability which, like the notions of randomness and statistical independence, will not be part of our study. We are thus construing 'logic' in a narrow sense which excludes investigations such as that of Keynes and, similarly where the interest is in analysing, and obtaining a definition of, 'degree of confirmation'.
After the advent of many-valued logics in the 1920s, with both finite and infinitely many values, it was natural to associate probability with a logic of infinitely many values. The period 1932-1936 saw a spate of papers on the subject. The most zealous proponent of treating probability as a many-valued logic was Reichenbach whose first paper on the idea appeared in 1932. A good account of his work appears in his 1949 book [12] . In opposition to Reichenbach, Tarski [16] , reflecting the ideas of various Polish philosophers, declared that a revamping of the present system of logic in order to obtain a methodologically correct foundation for probability (which was Reichenbach's aim) was neither necessary nor desirable-a chief criticism being the "nonextensionality" of probability as an operator on propositions. For instance, in many-valued logics the "truths-value of a logical sum (alternation) is determined by those of its components, whereas the probability of a logical sum is not a (single-valued) function of the probabilities of its components. Reichenbach counters this criticism of nonextensionality by what is in essence a hidden variable argument. Based on the probability formula
he writes the table
restrictive conditions: < u < -, P P thus making P(A V B) depend on three arguments one of which involves a conditional probability. Derivable formulas of his probability logic are either formulas stating that a logical expression has probability 1 (e.g., P(A V -iA) = 1) or formulas coming from the well-known calculus of probabilities expressing relations between probabilities (e.g., P(B) = P(A)P(B\A) + P(-iA)P(B\-iA)). Tarski [16] declared that Reichenbach's probability logic is not a many-valued logic but rather a chapter of the usual two-valued logic.
In Carnap [2] , as in Keynes, the central notion is that of a (confirmation) relation between pairs of sentences and with a function assigning numerical values to such pairs. Unlike Keynes, there is a deeper analysis of the formal language.
More directly related to our topic are considerations which assign probability values to simple sentences and which study its transmission through to more complicated sentences (as one does for truth in Tarski semantics). In Gaifman [5] we have a generalization of the semantic notion of a model for a first-order language in which probability values replace truth-values. Gaifman's idea is extended to infinitary languages and intensively investigated in Scott and Krauss [14] , where a probability logic is developed on this basis.
At the other extreme, in contrast to the Scott and Krauss work, here we remain entirely on the propositional level. We develop a probability logic appropriate to this level from a consideration of the truth-table idea, slightly generalized, along with properties of probability. The notion of probability is presupposed as part of the semantics, and questions as to its nature will play no more role than does the nature of truth in usual logic. A small set of properties, shared by essentially all theories of probability, is all that we shall appeal to. What we come up with could conceivably be viewed as a many-valued logic in that propositions take on more than two values-viz., the real numbers in the interval [0,1]-but it differs from what has been known and studied as manyvalued logic in a number of important details.
For one thing, although the formal language of our probability logic has the same symbols as that of two-valued logic there is an uncoupling of the connection between value assigning functions (''truth''-functions) and connectives-values associated with a formula are not strictly determined by its linguistic structure but by its probability-related structure, namely by its representation in terms of basic conjunctions on its variables (corresponding to 'elementary event', 'state-description', and the like, in probability treatments). Moreover, the logic is not given syntactically, i.e., by specifying some set of starting formulas and rules of inference for deriving others, but semantically, by defining 'logical consequence' using the notion of a 'probability model'. Although the definition of 'modeP for probability logic is pretty much what one would expect, the definition of 'logical consequence' has an unusual feature in that its assertions concern formulas having a value in a set of values (rather than some designated value (or values)), and in such assertions all probability values are on a par. When the sets of values are subintervals of [0,1] there is a decision procedure for determining whether or not a logical consequence relation holds.
/ The true-false logic of propositions
Although the true-false logic of propositions is obviously well-known, we nevertheless wish to sketch this elementary portion of standard logic in a form that will enable us to see how probability logic generalizes it.
One can either start out by assuming a (potentially infinite) list of unanalyzed "atomic" sentences of some arbitrary, but fixed, language or, as we shall be doing, assuming a list of formal propositional variables taking on such propositions as values. Then, using (i) propositional variables: Aγ 9 ..., A n >.,.
we may construct in customary fashion the formulas of the (two-valued) propositional logic.
The fundamental relation governing inference, the relation of logical consequence, is defined in terms of models. We use a slightly variant definition of model so as to bring out that the validity of an inference depends only on a finite number of propositional variables. We symbolize (2) by writing 
More generally, we can introduce a consequence relation of the form,
where the symbols a { ,..., a m , β represent any of the sets {0}, {1}, {0,1). As an example, the eight rows of a truth-table computing values for φ\=A x 
leading to three statements of the form (5):
This generalized form of logical consequence, while of little interest for two-valued logic, will serve as a prototype for that of probability logic.
Probability-valued logic
Purely abstract forms of many-valued logics, introduced by "truth"-tables with either finite or infinitely many values assigned to propositional arguments, have been known since the 1920s. The subject has had fairly extensive development: current bibliographies (as in [13] 
In view of difficulties stemming from lack of clarity in this connection, the possibility of using probabilities as values seems especially attractive; for although the nature of probability may be in philosophical dispute, we do have a clear idea of its properties, particularly in relation to not, and, and or. A comparison of these properties in the two cases, i.e., for truth and for probability, will suggest an appropriate definition of 'model' for probability logic. We assume in both cases a common formal language, that described in Section 1.
For truth-vahie assignments to formulas the properties needed are that each formula (as representative of a proposition) has either 0 or 1 as a value, and the logical connectives behave truth-functionally in the well-known manner exemplified by the conventional truth-tables. But it is clear that we cannot, in general, extend probability values for variables A\ 9 . . ., A n to formulas (on these variables). However, if we restrict ourselves to formulas constructed from some initial set by means of only negation and alter nation-with-disjointcomponents, then we can extend probabilities from this initial set to all such formulas. But, as all formulas (on A u ..., A n ) are expressible as a disjunction (or negation of a disjunction) of basic conjunctions (on A Ϊ9 ..., A n ), we can, by taking basic conjunctions as the initial set, extend probabilities to all formulas. We are thus led to the following definition.
Let kj (j = 1,..., 2 n ) be real numbers such that for eachy, kj G [0,1], and such that the sum of all is 1. A probability model M (adequate for a set of formulas χi,..., XΛO is an assignment of the numbers kj to the basic conjunctions Kj on variables Aχ 9 . . ., A n , where this list of variables is long enough to include all those occurring in χ l5 ..., χ N .
We write P M (Kj) for the value assignment by Mto Kj (i.e., P M (Kj) = kj) and extend P M to all formulas on A u ..., A n by setting P M (Φ) = Σ iΦ) kj, where the summation is over all j for which Kj implies φ or, lacking such, we set PM(Φ) = 0. By 'Kj implies φ' we mean with Kj and φ taken as formulas in the ordinary two-valued sense. Thus we are including two-valued logic as part of our semantic apparatus. The so-defined function P M satisfies the following general properties of probability:
Note that if in a probability model M some A: /n = 1 (and hence all other k/s are 0) then for / = 1,...,«, the formula Aj has P M value 0, or 1, according as Ai appears negated, or unnegated, in K JQ . Such models then coincide with two-valued models.
We now define logical consequence for probability logic. For this we use as our prototype the more general form of two-valued logic introduced in Section 1.
Let ot ι ,...,a m , β be subsets of [0,1]. The (probability) logical consequence relation, denoted by
is defined as: For all probability models M (adequate for φ u .. ., φ m , ψ):
The intuitive picture here is that of a "truth"-table entered from basic conjunctions K u ..., K 2n with additional columns headed φ ls ..., φ m , ψ. The K u ..., K 2n are assigned all possible sets of 2 n real numbers from [0,1], the sum of such numbers in each set being 1. Each assignment (row) determines a probability model and corresponding values for φ Ϊ9 . . ., φ w , ψ. The premise conditions in (1) select out of the 2*° rows of the table those in which the probabilities of the φ, are, respectively, in the sets α, , the relation (1) then holding if for each of these rows ψ has a probability in β.
When a subset a of [0,1] is a singleton, say, a = {a}, then we shall write P(φ) =ain place of P(φ) e a.
Theorem 2.1 ^P(Φ) = 1 iff φ is a (two-valued) tautology.
Proof: (a) If φ is a tautology then, for any M, P M (Φ) = 1. (b) If φ is not a tautology then its expansion as an alternation of basic conjunctions (we assume it has one, otherwise it is equivalent to A x Λ -ιAy and hence PM(Φ) -0) is missing at least one conjunction, say K Jr There are models in which k Jχ Ψ 0; in any suchP M (φ)*l. Since properties P1-P3 hold for any P M we can list any of the simple identities derivable from these properties as probability consequence relations.
For example, P(φ V ψ) = P(φ) + P(ψ) -P(φ Λ ψ) can be rephrased as

P(φ) = a, P(ψ) =b, P(φA\ls)=ct=P(φVψ)=a + b-c .
However for the more substantial results we are going to arrive at we need, not particular identities, but some general theorems. Since these theorems are not well-known and, also, provide an effective procedure for obtaining the strongest conclusion from a set of premises, we devote a section to a short exposition.
Some theorems about probability algebras
In the preceding section we considered probability measures on sets of formulas built up from the propositional variables A\,. . ., A n and the connectives -ι, Λ, V. But since (by Pl(ii)) logically equivalent formulas have the same probability values, we can simplify the structure carrying the probability measure by ''identifying" logically equivalent formulas, namely by going over to the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra, i.e., the Boolean algebra of equivalence classes of logical formulas modulo logical equivalence. However we shall not bother to change notation, using -i, Λ, V in place of ~, O, U, (and with 0, the zero element of the algebra being the equivalence class determined by A { Λ -L4I). The general notion here is that of a probability algebra: an ordered pair (B,P), where B is a Boolean algebra and P a real-valued function, a probability function, defined on elements of B> with the properties (PI) (i)P(,4)>0
(
(In strictness the Ψ' should carry an indication, e.g., a subscript, of the Boolean algebra it is associated with but we shall usually omit it, introducing it only when necessary.)
Given (P1)-(P3) it is readily shown that 1
max[0,P(,4)+P(£) -1} <P(AB) < min{P(A),P(B)} , a result giving upper and lower bounds for P(AB) in terms of P(A) and P(B)
which are good for any probability algebra. (For a "primitive" treatment of this inequality relation see [1] , pp. 298-299.) Are these "best possible", i.e., could there be another function of P(A) and P(B) giving bounds for P(AB), good for all probability algebras, which would be narrower in some cases? As Frechet shows (in [4] ), these bound functions are indeed best possible since, for example, in the case of the upper bound, no matter what values P(A) and P(B) may have, there is a probability algebra and elements A and B in it such that P(AB) = min{P(. 4 
), P(B)}.
This result of Frechet's was generalized in [6] , where the following was established: 
We give a brief indication of the ideas behind the proof of Theorem 3.1 (full details are in [6] ). As an illustration we take the simple example of finding Uφ for φ(Aι,A 2 2 . In any probability algebra in which A\ and A 2 are elements we have the quantities k\ = P(A ι A 2 ), k 2 = P{Aχ-^A 2 ), k 3 = P(-iAιA 2 ) , and k 4 = P(^A X -^A 2 ), where A X A 2 , A X -*A 2 , -ιAιA 2 9 and -^A X^A2 are the four basic conjunctions on A u A 2 . Then, as shown in [6] , the least upper bound of the values P(φ (A\,A 2 ) ) 9 as one varies the probability algebra and the elements A u A 2 of the algebra (subject to the condition that P (Ai) -a t (ι-1,2) ) is the same as finding the maximum of g = k\ + k 3 + k 4 [ = P(φ{Aι 9 A 2 ))], subject to the constraints (2), and that the quantities a u a 2 no longer appear in the constraint conditions but are coefficients in the form a x x λ + a 2 x 2 + 1 x 3 ; also that the matrix on the right-hand side in (3) reproduces in order the k's associated with P(φ (A u A 2 
, and is uniquely determined by the structure of φ. From linear programming theory we know that if conditions (3) are consistent then the minimum of the linear form r occurs at a corner point {x u x 2 ,x 3 ) of the polytope defined by (3). In our particular case these points are found to be (-1,1,1) and (0,0,1) giving then
Best lower bounds are found by noting that L φ (a x ,. .., a n ) = 1 -U^φ(a ι ,...,a n ) .
Consistency conditions for the linear system (1) are easily seen by inspection to be 0 < a x < 1, 0 < a 2 < 1. In general, there is an effective procedure for determining consistency of any system of linear inequations which may also include equations (see, for example, [15] , Section 1.1). In this case, unlike for Theorem 3.1 where the consistency conditions are the simple 0 < a t < 1, the requirements here imposed by the constraints #, < P(Φi) < b x demand considerably more. Nevertheless, the system of linear inequalities in the kj(j = 1,..., 2 n ) which expresses the constraints is effectively decidable as to consistency.
A special case of Theorem 3.2 which will be of interest to us is that for which Φi(Aι,.. ., A n ) =A h Here the constraints become The guiding ideas for the proof of Theorem 3.2 are similar to those for Theorem 3.1 (see [6] , Section 6).
We point out that, as far as the determination of best lower and upper bounds for a ψ(Aι,..., A n ) is concerned, appeal to probability algebras is replaceable by assignments of values to the kj taken as variables-with, of course, the requirements kjG [0,1] and Σkj=\ .
The only way the probability algebras enter into the problem is via the values kj. Hence varying all possible such values is equivalent to varying all possible probability algebras. In other words, the full generality of probability algebras is not needed, as we are concerned only with (finite) Boolean algebras which are generated by n generators and (call these generators A u ..., A n ) which have the property that \J' Kj = 0, where V indicates an alternation over a proper subset of the basic conjunctions on A u . .., A n , namely those having kj -0. Such probability algebras correspond precisely to our probability models.
Probability logic for intervals
By use of the results stated in the preceding section we can completely characterize the class of valid inference forms for probability logic when the sets involved are subintervals of [0, 1] . First a special case. Proof: Let Mbe a probability model for which P M {Aι) = a x (i = 1,..., n). By virtue of the discussion at the end of the preceding section we may consider P M as a probability function for a probability algebra and hence conclude that PM(Ψ) Ξ Pfψ(a\9-> <*«)> since the interval Pfψ{a λ ,..., a n ) contains P M (Φ) for any probability algebra in which P M (A) = ff, (/ = 1,..., Λ). The consistency conditions for the premises in Theorem 4.1 are simply that the α, be probability values, i.e., numbers in the interval [0, 1] . This can be proved formally, but is quite evident if one thinks of the A\ as regions of the unit square, each with area equal respectively to the assigned probability.
For the general theorem we first introduce an interval-valued function Pfj) is the probability interval-valued function defined above.
Proof: Immediate by Theorem 3.2.
Examples
In the following examples of inference forms for probability logic we restrict ourselves to premises in which the probability intervals contain a single value and the conclusion interval is the strongest possible, i.e., as given by Pfj φ) . Although unsophisticated techniques would suffice to establish these simple inferences, we shall nevertheless use the full-blown linear algebra technique in Example 1 in order to illustrate the general method. In the remaining examples we merely state results.
Example 1 (Generalizing modus ponens):
with consistency conditions on the parameters p and q\ p<\, q<\, p + q>\.
To show this let k x , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 be the values associated with the basic con-junctions on Λ u A 2 . On expressing the conditions in the premises in terms of the k's, and adjoining the probability requirements on the /r's, we obtain
It is readily seen that these imply the stated consistency conditions on p and q.
(In general one can always use elimination techniques, e.g., Fourier elimination, for determining consistency of systems of linear inequations.) To find the best upper bound for P(A 2 ) subject to conditions (1) one needs to find max k\ + k 3 , subject to In the preceding three examples the formula in the conclusion was a necessary consequence (in the two-valued sense) of the formulas in the premises. Here is a simple example where this is not the case: P(A!) = a x ,..., P(A n ) = a n ι= P(A x V A 2 V ... V A n ) E [maxftf!,..., a n ], min{l, a { + α 2 + +^)]
Our methods readily extend to cases in which the arguments for C can be contingent (P(A t :-> C) = bi), and also to the inclusion in the premises of interrelations among the Aι when these can be logically expressed. In contrast to Riechenbach's having to use an additional variable to express P(A X V A 2 ) in terms of P(Aι) and P{A 2 ) i note how Example 5 expresses the interval for P{A X V A 2 ) solely in terms of P(A X ) and P(A 2 ).
One might observe that the upper and lower bounding functions occurring in Examples 1-5 are obtainable by functional compositions from the two functions f(x,y) =min{l, 1 -x + y] g(x) = 1 -x , which are the conditional and negation of Lukasiewicz many-valued logic on the unit interval. However, this is not a general feature. 
